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Abstract In this paper, we engage in a philosophical investigation of how blockchain
technologies such as cryptocurrencies can mediate our social world. Emerging
blockchain-based decentralised applications have the potential to transform our finan-
cial system, our bureaucracies and models of governance. We construct an ontological
framework of Bnarrative technologies^ that allows us to show how these technologies,
like texts, can configure our social reality. Drawing from the work of Ricoeur and
responding to the works of Searle, in postphenomenology and STS, we show how
blockchain technologies bring about a process of emplotment: an organisation of
characters and events. First, we show how blockchain technologies actively configure
plots such as financial transactions by rendering them increasingly rigid. Secondly, we
show how they configure abstractions from the world of action, by replacing human
interactions with automated code. Third, we investigate the role of people’s interpreta-
tive distances towards blockchain technologies: discussing the importance of greater
public involvement with their application in different realms of social life.
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1 Introduction
One of the incipient global narratives about revolutionary technological innovations
revolves around the so-called blockchain technology, with the well-known
cryptocurrency Bitcoin as its most well-known instantiation (Roio 2013, p. 12). The
imagined potential of the blockchain is coming to fruition in recent years, with the
development of applications that mimic services that are usually exclusively offered by
governments like Bitnation (Allison 2015), initiatives for citizen engagement and new
forms of democratic participation like D-Cent (D-Cent 2015) and digital platforms for
the creations of all sorts of decentralised applications, like the Ethereum platform
(Wood 2014). In this paper, we investigate blockchain technologies and the way they
are able to transform our society from a philosophical perspective. By virtue of doing
so, we counter the instrumental view according to which humans merely use
blockchain technologies for pre-defined purposes and instead show how blockchain
technologies can actively shape our social world.
Philosophy of Technology increasingly engages with the study of financial technol-
ogies and their social, cultural and political ramifications. For instance, it discusses how
the rise of technologies that enable high frequency trading (HFT) has contributed to an
ontological process of Bdistancing^, investigating high-speed, global financial transac-
tions that create distances between people in the real economy (Coeckelbergh 2015b).
Similarly, it discusses how the rise of digitalised global derivative trades that triggered
the financial crisis in 2008 Bre-organised our understanding dynamic character of a
world of informationalised, monetised space-speed^ (Pryke and Allen 2000, p.282).
Since blockchain technology is not only claimed to be the Bnew big thing^ for financial
technologies, but also seen as able to transform organisations, democratic governance
and human culture as a whole (Tapscott and Tapscott 2016), we believe that it is
valuable and urgent that Philosophy of Technology would engage with it. However, up
until now, philosophers of technology have largely neglected blockchain technologies
as a serious topic of investigation. We aim to answer to this neglect, by engaging in a
philosophical investigation of the way in which blockchain technologies might shape
our understanding of the social world.
We situate our investigation in the context of a growing number of social critiques of
blockchain technologies, which predominantly focus on Bitcoin. Scott (2015) distin-
guishes four types of such critiques. The first type criticises the libertarian ideology that
underlies the blockchain technology, by raising the argument that the individual
empowerment it enables does not trickle down to collective empowerment; that certain
forms of social injustice are still possible and perhaps even amplified by using
blockchain technologies (Golumbia 2015). The second type focuses on the concern
that the already powerful strata of society benefit the most from the possibilities of the
blockchain, which amplifies political divides on the basis of gender, race, education
level. Bitcoin is therefore not the Bapolitical^ economical technology it is often
assumed to be (Kostakis and Giotitsas 2014, p. 437). The third type focuses on the
claim that, even if the technology can be considered to be neutral, it still can be abused.
For instance, it can be used for criminal activities, money laundering and blackmailing
(Ogunbadewa 2014), and even (unintentionally) lead to a centralisation of power in the
hands of a small number of Bmining pools^ (Scott 2015). The fourth type focuses on
the intrinsic power dynamics of the technology itself, on the way it mediates social
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relations of people conducting transactions and setting up Bsmart contracts^. Rather
than rendering conventional governance fully obsolete, the blockchain introduces a
novel form, a new infrastructure of governance with its own power-dynamics
(Kavanagh and Miscione 2015; DuPont 2014). In these latter critiques, it is argued
that blockchain technologies have the capacity to transform our social reality.
Adding in particular to the fourth type of these critiques, our aims in this paper are
(1) to provide for an ontological framework that helps us to understand how blockchain
technologies mediate human social reality and (2) to use this framework to explore the
normative implications of this mediation, focusing on the example of cryptocurrencies.
Thus, rather than studying and discussing particular ideological or ethical issues, we
start from an ontological and hermeneutic analysis of blockchain technologies—with a
particular focus on cryptocurrencies. We thereby do not approach the normative
implications of technology in the way applied moral and political philosophy do, i.e.
by means of discussing blockchain technology according to ethical and political
principles (e.g. justice, autonomy) and values, or by applying established ethical and
political theories. Instead, we propose an ontological framework inspired by the work
of Paul Ricoeur that allows us to investigate the normative impacts of blockchain
technologies in a holistic manner, interpreting blockchain them as what we call
narrative technologies. Using this framework, we particularly focus on the active role
that blockchain technologies can have in shaping our social reality.
To structure our argument, we first critically reflect on ways in which John
Searle’s social ontology, postphenomenological theory and approaches in social
studies of science and technology (STS) can shed light on our understanding of
blockchain technologies, to eventually turn to the hermeneutic work of Ricoeur.
Taking Ricoeur’s narrative theory as the basis of our ontological framework, we
show how blockchain technology can be understood by investigating the way it
configures our human narrative understanding. Using the ontological framework
of narrative technologies, we then discuss the normative implications of
blockchain technologies by considering the extent to which they actively config-
ure the human understanding of the social world, the extent to which they bring
about abstractions from the world of action and to what kind of interpretative
distances they configure. For this analysis, we focus on cryptocurrencies because
they represent as yet the most Bworldly^ instantiation of blockchain-powered
technologies (being already developed and used widely on a global scale).
2 The Blockchain as a Narrative Technology
In this section, we inquire into the meaning and use of blockchain technologies by
discussing how we can understand them ontologically, as elements of human social
reality. This question needs to be addressed, for no normative implications can be
derived from a phenomenon that is not properly understood and of which most possible
implications still lie in the future rather than in a present that we can subject to empirical
scrutiny. The blockchain, which was developed as the underlying Bnervous system^ of
the cryptocurrency Bitcoin (Vigna and Casey 2015, p. 92), will be the central focus of
this paper. In 2008, Bitcoin’s mysterious founder—or group of founders—Satoshi
Nakamoto, characterised Bitcoin as an Belectronic payment system based on
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cryptographic proof instead of trust^ (Nakamoto 2008, p. 1). Its architecture had been
based on the blockchain protocol, Bwhich assures transaction authenticity, integrity, and
ordering^ (Folkinshteyn 2015, p. 84). As a Bconsensus mechanism^, the blockchain as
applied to Bitcoin was meant to overcome deficiencies of conventional monetary
systems that function thanks to consensus based on trust in institutions.
The main innovative feature of blockchain technology is arguably not its potential for
bringing about pseudonymous transactions between sending and receiving addresses,1
but its capacity to track transactions within decentralised, public databases and thereby
excluding counterfeiting and fraud (Kostakis and Giotitsas 2014, p. 434). This capacity
relates to the possibility to decentralise authority and conduct transactions on a peer-to-
peer basis by using blockchain-based technologies. In the case of cryptocurrencies, this
has the implication that governments and banks (the Bmiddlemen^) are not needed to
authenticate and validate monetary transactions; these tasks are delegated to the tech-
nology and the network supporting it. The blockchain can be regarded as a public digital
ledger (a book of accounts) that contains all the transactions made within its system.
BBlocks^ are digital, time-stamped records containing the most recent transactions that
are cryptographically signed and added to the blockchain in a designated sequence, in a
linear, chronological manner (Mcreynolds et al. 2015, p. 3). Whenever a transaction
occurs, anywhere in the world, so-called Bminers^ validate it and add it to the public
blockchain, which makes it impossible for the same digital object (which could be
money, but also a contractual agreement) to be Bdouble spent^: to be transacted to
different addresses at the same time. The miners are the agents that collectively control
the computational nodes validating transactions within the network. For Bitcoin, the
service these miners provide is guaranteed according to a system of incentives, which
currently amounts to the miners being rewarded newly created Bitcoins.
Already in the 1980s, David Chaum, the developer of one of Bitcoin’s main
predecessors called Digicash, argued that the rise of decentralised applications (which
the blockchain enables to build) could bring about major global changes by solving
(ethical) problems of mass surveillance, online participation and democratic gover-
nance (Chaum 1985, p. 1044). In less than a decade since the birth of Bitcoin in 2008,
the applications of blockchain technologies seem to increasingly move in the direction
Chaum predicted—and in multiple other directions, some of which might even go
against Chaum’s hopeful expectations. Apart from cryptocurrencies, the blockchain
protocol allows for the creation of so-called Bsmart contracts^—including property
right contracts and insurance contracts—systems for Bdistributed governance^ like
voting systems and decentralised governance of companies and organisations (also
called Decentralised Autonomous Organisations or DAOs) (Vigna and Casey 2015).
Currently, conventional political and financial powers have begun to regulate or
appropriate blockchain technologies, like the state of New York which has issued a
BBitLicense^ for companies dealing with Bitcoin (New York State Department of
fincancial services 2015) and the Santander bank which is investing in blockchain
innovations (Williams-Grut 2015). Thus, blockchain technologies are not only
1 In its original form, Bitcoin allows only for pseudonymous use rather than for anonymous use, as is often
believed, although the level of anonymity can be improved by means of specialized techniques like using
Bmixing^ services that mix transactions to confuse the link between sender and receiver (Möser 2013).
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influencing the ways we understand and use money and contractual relations, but also
the governance of our societies.
We approach the development and application blockchain technologies as a chal-
lenging paradigmatic technological trend from a philosophical perspective for three
distinct reasons. Firstly, we use the blockchain as an illustrative example to develop our
philosophical framework of narrative technologies that, as we argue elsewhere
(Coeckelbergh and Reijers 2016), is suitable for understanding what we will later on
designate as the active, abstracting configuration of ICTs: the capacity of ICTs to shape
people’s understanding of the social world. Secondly, the blockchain gives rise to a
generic ICT infrastructure and does therefore not merely refer to a single novel technol-
ogy, but to what some already designate as the Bdecentralised web 3.0^ (Gerring 2016):
an internet different from the World-Wide Web that is inherently decentralised and
would fundamentally alter the way we organise online interactions. Thirdly, the
blockchain is a technology that is explicitly designed to organise aspects of our reality
in a way that has been shown to be philosophically significant (see, e.g. Kavanagh and
Miscione 2015; DuPont 2014).2 Because of their capacity to challenge authority and to
control interactions in the respective crypto economies, cryptocurrencies are argued to
be Bweapons in the new control society .^ (DuPont 2014, p. 7). Not only can philosophy
therefore be used to understand how blockchain technologies mediate our social world,
but the reverse seems also to be true: the understanding of blockchain technologies can
inform philosophical theories that account for how modern technologies shape society.
2.1 The Social Ontology of Blockchain Technologies
In order to ground our analysis of the normative impacts of blockchain technologies,
we first need to delve into the question of how we can understand these technologies
ontologically and how we can conceptualise the ways in which they mediate the human
life-world. One straightforward answer to the ontological question of what blockchain
technologies are is that they are programming codes and strings of data: that we can
ontologically describe the technology by referring to the ever-growing digital chain
containing records of transactions. Advancing the ontological question, we can state
that the blockchain consists of programming code as a sequence of symbols that can be
read by computing devices. However, this code has a significant human and indeed
social-institutional dimension. Cryptographic code, as Lessig argues, is similar to
human-made law for it can enforce confidentiality as well as identification in similar
ways as law can (Lessig 2006, p. 53). John Searle offers an ontological theory of social
reality that explains the similarity between law and programming code by pointing at
their linguistic origins. He states that all human-made phenomena, ranging from streets
to governments to laws, share a linguistic basis. The origin of certain artificial phe-
nomena, called institutional facts, is traced back to linguistic entities called Bstatus
function declarations^ (Searle 2010, p. 13). An example of a simple status function
declaration is BI hereby declare that the provided information is true^. By agreeing with
2 The narratives surrounding blockchain technologies concerning Bdistributed^ technologies and Bdistributed^
organisation and governance as a result show surprising similarities with the expectations people had during
the dawn of the World-Wide Web (Naughton 1998, p. 98). At least in the case of the Internet, history has
shown to be largely different than expected.
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such a statement in an ICT-mediated setting, the linguistic act of agreeing (the speech
act) results in a new reality (Searle 2006, p. 69): it provides the agreeing party with a
new set of digital rights and duties, of constitutive rules, that define the ontology of the
respective ICT environment.
Status function declarations include both locutionary aspects (linguistic aspects,
propositions) and illocutionary aspects (extra-linguistic aspects: intentional states like
a beliefs and desires). They are characterised by what Searle calls a Bdouble direction of
fit^: a notion that refers to the fit between the locutionary, propositional aspect of the
declaration and the human directedness to the world implied by the illocutionary aspect
(Searle 2010, p. 12). For declarations, two different illocutionary aspects coincide: the
desire to make something the case and the belief to make something the case. In other
words, if we declare something to be the case, we are able to create a reality while
desiring it to come about. For example, when a certain person declares to become the
president of the United States, the propositional form of the declaration BI, Barack
Obama, hereby declare that…^, fits with the collective desire to bring about a new state
of affairs implying a new ontological reality (the new president of the United States).
When we apply Searle’s theoretical model to understand the ontology the phenom-
enon of blockchain technologies, we can state that they indeed can be understood as
status function declarations. They are declarations because they have a linguistic,
propositional structure that allows them to bring about their own reality. Moreover,
they are status function declarations because their meaning depends on a coinciding
structure of human desires and beliefs: when using the blockchain of a cryptocurrency,
we believe the new state of affairs (a transaction) which coincides with our desire to
bring it about (we wanted the transaction to occur). These desires and beliefs do not
belong only to the individual but to a collective. We collectively intend status function
declarations to become part of our social reality. In other words, the individual act of
transacting an amount of cryptocurrency depends on the collective intentionality that
amounts to the validity of this act. In the words of Nakamoto, collective Bconsensus^
(and to achieve this, a Bconsensus mechanism^) is needed in order to make the system
of status function declarations work (Nakamoto 2008, p. 8).
However, this does not seem to lead to an adequate understanding of the socio-
linguistic grounding of cryptocurrencies. Two main lacunas make Searle’s theory
inadequate to serve as a solid basis for the examination of cryptocurrencies. First of
all, Searle leaves the gap between individual intentionality and collective intentionality
unexplained, merely stating that collective intentions are biologically primitive phe-
nomena: intentionality in the Bwe^ mode instead of in the BI^ mode. By suggesting this
reductionist view, he disqualifies the impact of culture that is precisely not reducible to
human biology (Heidemann 1999, p. 259). Since we are particularly interested in
understanding how individual intentionality is culturally mediated to arrive at the
collective consensus constituted by blockchain technology, we are in need of a
theoretical framework that does account for the interrelation between individual and
collective intentionality. Secondly, Searle’s theory does not include an aspect of
normativity that is needed to explain why declarations can have a status function at
all (Heidemann 1999, p. 260). In the case of cryptocurrencies, we would want to
explain why we assign a status function to them. In more common terms, we would
want to explain why people assign value (not just economic value, but also emotional
and political values) to cryptocurrencies. This is not a trivial point, for the meaning of
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cryptocurrencies (as well as their classification as money) depends on their relation to
human normative values.
2.2 Turning Towards Narrative Theory
In order to overcome the problematic aspects of Searle’s social ontology, we turn
towards theories in philosophy of technology and in social studies of science and
technology (STS). First, we consider postphenomenological theories of technology that
focus on the role of technological mediation. As Ihde concedes, instead of understand-
ing technologies as formations of formal rules, we should aim to understand the way in
which their materiality shapes our experience of the world (Ihde 2009). We might for
instance say that a technology such as glasses constitute an Bembodied^ experience of
the world or, as Verbeek puts it, that technologies such as scientific instruments make
our objects of experience Bpresent in a specific way^ (Verbeek 2005, p.141). Conse-
quently, we can analyse blockchain technology by conceptualising the kind of rela-
tionship it constitutes between the subject and its life world. However, the focus on the
material aspects of technologies in postphenomenological theories neglects the impor-
tant role of linguistic and symbolic mediations (Coeckelbergh 2015a) that is at stake
when aiming to understand the mediating role of blockchain technologies. Moreover,
the focus of these theories on the individual mediation captured by the subject-
technology-world relationship fails to provide for an explanation of how Bbeing-with-
each-other^, social relationships (Van Den Eede 2010) are shaped by technologies.
Therefore, the conceptual leap from technological mediation at the individual to the
collective level remains as problematic as in Searle’s social ontology.
Secondly, we consider approaches in STS that unlike postphenomenological theo-
ries are more focused on the role of language, by capturing technological mediation
using notions of Bde-scribing^ Bscripts^ of technological objects (Akrich 1992) or the
Binterpretative flexibility^ of artefacts (Pinch and Bijker 1984). Works in STS focus on
the relevance of the mediation of the collective: mapping networks of social groups or
of human and non-human actors. For instance, Jasanoff argued that Bsocio-technical
imaginaries^, which are Bcollectively held, institutionally stabilised and publicly per-
formed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of
social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science
and technology^ (Jasanoff 2015, p.6) shape the design of technologies. These socio-
technical imaginaries can incorporate accounts of technological artefacts in popular
fiction, but also institutional narratives of nationhood and citizenship. On a slightly
different note, expanding on works such as Winner’s analysis of the politics of
architectural structures (Winner 1980), Edwards argues that socio-technical infrastruc-
tures are designed according to Bmutual orientation^ of normative goals of both small
social groups and large institutions towards a design of a socio-technical system
(Edwards 2004, p.22). Dawson and Buchanen articulate an informative perspective
on this kind of approaches in STS, arguing that technology change happens through the
outcomes of competing narratives (Dawson and Buchanan 2005), a process of inter-
action between interpretations of technologies that would be characterised by Pinch and
Bijker as Bclosure^ (Pinch and Bijker 1984, p.44).
Indeed, the development of blockchain technology seems to be influenced by
different interpretations of social groups and institutions (for instance, the cypherpunk
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movement and government regulators in the state of New York3). Moreover, it seems to
revolve around a Bsocio-technical imaginary ,^ being amongst others the Blibertarian
dream^ of stateless institutions such as Bitcoin that has driven its development
(Karlstrøm 2014). In a similar vein, Joerges (1999) argues, against Winner, that
narratives play an important role in politics of technologies. Turning to blockchain
technologies, we could say that people construct narratives about them, which are
related to the expectations and negotiations various individuals and organisations hold.
As such, development of technologies such as Bitcoin is indicative of a politics,
understood as interactions between social discourses and social imaginaries.
Thus, STS approaches focus predominantly on interpretations and narratives about
technology. As Pinch and Bijker explain, a distinct social group might have a certain
interpretation of a technology that subsequently influences a discourse between different
actors (relevant social groups). This focus on narratives about technologies as elements
of a social discourse puts human agency somewhat in the forefront. Even though it is
argued that a design is Bco-produced^ (Jasanoff 2015, p.16) or that artefacts, like words,
are also tools of politics (Joerges 1999), it is co-produced by different groups of people.
It therefore seems that these approaches insufficiently answer to the valuable lessons
gained from postphenomenological theories, namely that humans and technologies co-
shape reality: that a certain agency has to be ascribed to technologies as well (Verbeek
2005, p.112). Moreover, it seems that the narratives themselves are viewed as pre-given
and the technology design as a consequence of interaction between these narratives. For
instance, different social groups are said to have different interpretations of a technology,
and the design is changed accordingly. Conversely, in line with Searle, we should say
that technological structures, as consisting of systems of status function declarations, do
not just incorporate interpretations or delegate scripts, but create or constitute new social
realities. Therefore, we do not merely want to ask how different interpretations of
blockchain technologies shape their designs, but also how the technology itself in turn
shapes our understanding of the world we live in.
Going back to the idea that a Bcompetition^ between narratives can result in
technology change, as Dawson and Buchanen suggest, we suggest to re-frame the
problem they present by asking: how do humans and technologies co-shape the
narrative structures that have the potential to transform our understanding of our
technologically mediated social reality? Such an approach might answer to the concern
raised by Feenberg about postphenomenological theories of technology and theories in
STS, namely that they provide for a convincing relational ontology but insufficiently
offer a corresponding hermeneutic theory of meaning (Feenberg 2009, p.228). At the
same time, we have to resist ideas of technological determinism such as the one
proposed byWinner, because our framework should explicitly acknowledge the agency
of both humans and technologies in the mediation of social reality. These concerns
caused us to turn to narrative theory, and notably to the work of Paul Ricoeur.
With regards to the ontological significance of narrative, there are various philo-
sophical views on how this concept can contribute to our understanding of the social
world and on the way in which they shape social reality. Some scholars consider
3 For instance, consider this article on the resistance of Bitcoin activists to regulation of Bitcoin, as has
happened in the State of New York: https://www.bitcoinnotbombs.com/the-declaration-of-bitcoins-
independence/, accessed on 04-03-2016.
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narrative as an instrumental cognitive ability or linguistic tool, whereas others consider
it as an ontological category connected to the way humans are in the world (Meretoja
2014, p.89) or understand human life itself as having a narrative character (e.g. see
Macintyre 2007, p.114) Another theoretical division with regards to the role of
narrative exists between an empiricist tradition that denounces narrative as a funda-
mental philosophical concept (e.g. see Strawson 2004) and a hermeneutic tradition that
instead rejects the idea of experience unmediated by narratives. The latter tradition
holds that all representations of the human social world are mediated by human-
linguistic interpretation (see, e.g. Taylor 1971, p.4), that subjectivity is always mediated
by language, Bby ‘signs, symbols and texts’^ (Meretoja 2014: 96). Ricoeur belongs to
the philosophical tradition that conceptualises narrative as being deeply connected to
human lives, as a fundamental mediator of human social existence. Thus, rather than
viewing narrative merely as an instrumental or discursive tool that shapes the design
process of technologies, we argue that it should be understood as a fundamental
ontological aspect of human social reality.
Going beyond philosophy, multiple scholars have shown how a narrative ontology can
improve our understanding of concrete aspects of our social world. For instance, Bruner
explains how we can increase our understanding of human psychology, as embedded in a
cultural context, by looking at how a Btext affects the reader^ (Bruner 1986, p.4). As such,
he claims that narratives can Bmake events^ and even Bmake history^ (p.42). In a similar
vein, Czarniawsma employs a methodology for organisation studies that allows for an
understanding of the Breflexive nature^ of the human condition as the basis for collective
action (Czarniawsma 1998, p.77). She understands an organisation as a story, understood
as a social construct that is shaped by human interaction and interpretation through
narratives. Gotham and Staples show how the significance of narrative goes beyond our
understanding of history and can help to analyse Bhuman agency in processual, action-
oriented ways^ (Gotham and Staples 1996, p.492). As such, it is argued that a narrative
understanding of our social world would improve sociological inquiries. These and many
other scholars have shown how a narrative ontology can be fruitfully employed in studies
of different aspects of our social world. We will build on this idea, by exploring how
narrative theory, focusing on the work of Ricoeur, can assist us in studying the role of
blockchain technologies in our social world.
2.3 Exploring Ricoeur’s Narrative Theory
Unlike Searle, Ricoeur addresses the two aspects of linguistic mediation of social
reality we discussed in the previous section. Firstly, he characterises narratives as
cultural phenomena: accounting for ways in which we interact with narratives from
within our culturally embedded time. Secondly, he explains why narratives can con-
figure our social reality: because they configure narrative plots that refigure social
events (Borisenkova 2010, p.93) and thereby refigure our social reality. Emplotment,
which is the process that defines a narrative structure, has an outspoken normative
character because the characters in a narrative are not just neutral Bdoers^ as Searle
would portray them but are Bendowed with ethical qualities^ (Ricoeur 1983, p. 59).
Unlike generalised Bdoers^ like the rational economic man who figures in economic
theories, acting according to coherent, non-normative motives, characters can be good
or evil, rational and irrational: the protagonists or antagonists of the narrative structures.
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These features of Ricoeur’s theory enable him to go beyond Searle’s formal approach
and to provide a holistic, normative account of linguistic mediation of our social world.
Moreover, the notion of narrativity enables us to link the two spheres that modern
(analytic) thinking tries to keep separate: the material-technological and the narrative-
linguistic-cultural.
How could we utilise Ricoeur’s narrative theory to understand the technological
phenomena of cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology?Wewant to explore in what
sense these technologies can have Bnarrative^ qualities themselves, rather than being
merely shaped by narratives that are constructed about them. At first sight, the notion of
narrative seems to be far removed from anything technological. Since Ricoeur’s theory
revolves around the paradigm of the text, we need to justify the claim that the concept of
narrative in a text can be extended to the concept of a narrative technology. Technology
only plays a marginal role in Ricoeur’s work, although he explicitly argues that
narrativity should be considered as a general aspect of human existence that goes beyond
our understanding of literature and also includes distinct areas of human knowledge like
Bcosmology, geology, and biology^ (Ricoeur 1983, p. 135). Unfortunately, most
scholars in philosophy of technology dealing with the ways technologies mediate the
human life world (see for instance Ihde 2009; Feenberg 1999) do not include Ricoeur’s
work in their theories. However, David Kaplan has drawn a connection between
Ricoeur’s work and the philosophy of technology. He suggests that Ricoeur’s herme-
neutical method as well as his analysis of the hermeneutic circle between human
experience and narration can be fruitful in discussions about technology (Kaplan
2006, p.p. 43, 44) because these elements can enrich the analysis of technological
mediation by including notions of linguistic and social mediation. Moreover, he argues
that the model of the text can be utilised as the model of the mediation of experience by
technology (Kaplan 2006, p. 49), for it can explicate how humans interpret technologies
and how technologies play a role in our narrative understanding. Yet, although Kaplan
discusses the value of Ricoeur’s theory for philosophy of technology, he does not offer a
theory of technology that is inspired by Ricoeur’s work on narrative theory. Therefore,
we have ventured to construct a theory of narrative technologies that allows us to analyse
the normative impacts of blockchain technologies.
In one of his major works that consists of three volumes, Time and Narrative,
Ricoeur (1983; 1985; 1988) constructs a comprehensive narrative theory. Unlike
Searle, Ricoeur does not focus on the formal structure of language (like the formal
structure or syntax of programming code), but on its hermeneutic aspects: on the ways
people interpret language and, through language, how they understand their life world.
His theory revolves around a basic model that designates the way in which a text
considered as a narrative can mediate human reality. This central model consists of
three conceptual stages that indicate the move from Bnot having read^ to Bhaving read^
a narrative. Ricoeur claims that our social reality is embedded in a prefigured time. This
means that the way we experience our temporal, social existence is embedded in a
cultural context that is shaped by narrative structures (Ricoeur 1983, p. 54). For
instance, we understand ourselves and our life worlds through narratives about our
national identities (e.g. BI’m a citizen of the Netherlands), economic narratives (e.g. BI
lost my job due to the financial crisis^) and even technological narratives (e.g. Brobots
are going to render many jobs superfluous^). Thus, whenever we engage with human
language, we act from a cultural basis, which means that our understanding is shaped
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by the narratives that are a part of our collective narrative Brepertoire^ (Ricoeur 1983, p.
64). This view ties into Jasanoff’s account of socio-technical imaginary, as a collec-
tively held repertoire of narratives (Bvisions of the future^) embedded in Bshared forms
of life and social order^ (Jasanoff 2015, p.6). However, Ricoeur goes beyond this idea
of prefigured time and explains how an instance of a text in turn can configure this
collective narrative repertoire.
Prefigured time indicates the moment at which a human starts to interact with a text.
From the prefigured time, we proceed to the moment of the configured time, which is
the backbone of Ricoeur’s theory. The paradigm of configured time is the notion of the
plot in a story, brought about by the process of emplotment. The plot is defined as an
organisation of events that mediates between heterogeneous factors (such as agents,
goals and interactions) and the syntagmatic order of a narrative as a whole (Ricoeur
1983, p. 65). More commonly said, the plot is the organisation of elements of a
narrative (characters, events) that makes it possible for someone interacting with the
text to follow it to a certain conclusion. By means of configuration, Ricoeur argues, a
text refigures our understanding of the social world we live in. This notion can be
related to Searle’s account of the constitution of a new social reality by means of status
function declarations. However, the configuration of social reality as considered by
Ricoeur does not entail an analytical, Bdirect^ but rather a hermeneutic, Bindirect^
mediation of the world. The world of the text and our human world intersect at the
moment of refiguration (Ricoeur 1983, p. 71). Refiguration is therefore the third
conceptual moment in Ricoeur’s model: the moment at which the narrative circle has
been closed, or rather completed, and the life world of the reader has been transformed.
For our analysis of blockchain technologies, we will focus on their configurative
capacities, limiting our discussion to the second conceptual moment of Ricoeur’s
model. At this point, we should note that, as Ricoeur acknowledges (1983, p.76), the
relation between narrative structures and our understanding of the social world is a
circular one. To understand this relation, we have to deal with a hermeneutic circle that
consists of the stages of prefigured, configured and refigured time. However, this
hermeneutic circle is, in the words of Ricoeur, a Bhealthy^ one, Bin which arguments
advanced about each side of the problem aid one another^ (ibid.). In other words, the
organisation of the narrative structure helps us to understand the social world, but at the
same time, the understanding of the social world is the basis for any new narrative
structure. In what follows, we will use Ricoeur’s model of configuration to conceptu-
alise the way in which technologies can configure human social reality.
2.4 Constructing a Framework of Narrative Technologies
In this section, we present our general conceptual framework of narrative technologies
that is inspired by Ricoeur’s model of emplotment.4 Like texts, technologies have the
capacity to configure our narrative understanding by organising events into a mean-
ingful whole: a plot that encompasses both humans and technologies. For instance, we
can say that a car, as a technology, configures events such as Bstarting the engine^ and
Badjusting the mirrors^ in a meaningful whole that includes both human and non-
4 A first, preliminary outline of this theoretical framework can be found in a previous publication (Anonymous
2016)
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human characters. Many aspects of this process of technological emplotment are related
to a prefigured understanding of the world. For instance, before a person has ever
driven a car, she might already have an understanding of the way the traffic works and
of the car as a cultural artefact (including understanding of for instance the environ-
mental impact of the use of cars and the impact for drunk-driving). Through interaction
with the car, however, this prefigured understanding is configured; the understanding of
both the traffic and the car as an artefact is altered and configured into a new
understanding of the social world. 5 As such, the technology and the technological
system in which it is used play active roles in shaping the way we understand our
activities, experiences and relations with other people.
However, technologies do not configure our narrative understanding in only one
unified way.6 Firstly, configurations by technologies differ because some technologies
(in particular ICTs) might be very similar to the paradigm of the text while others (such as
a hammer) are very different from it. We capture this difference between technologies by
considering to what extent they bring about a process of active configuration. Secondly,
the narrative structures that technologies constitute can, like those of texts, abstract from
the world of action or engage with this world of action.We capture this difference between
technologies by considering the extent to which they bring about what Ricoeur designates
as quasi-entities or events that are configured in a quasi-plot. Important to note is that the
hermeneutic differences between technologies we establish are to be considered as
differences in degree rather than categorical differences in kind (denying for instance that
a technology can configure absolute abstracting narrative structures7). They function as the
epistemological Brelay stations^8 with which we can examine the ontological narrative
structures as configured through interaction with technologies.
The first hermeneutic distinction that we derive from Ricoeur’s theory relates to the
capacity of technologies to bring about an active process of configuration. Through
interaction with a text, a narrative actively re-organises the pre-figured understanding a
reader has of her social world (Ricoeur 1983, p.53). For instance, a reader might
understand the impact of surveillance technologies in a different way by reading
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. Similarly, we argue that a technology can actively
configure the narrative understanding of the social world of a person interacting with it.
A metaphorical comparison with a computer process might be helpful to illustrate this
process: in the process of reading data by a computer, data are simultaneously written.
This does not mean that reading and understanding of a text by a human is identical to a
computer-manipulating code, as Searle forcefully showed to be incorrect by means of
his BChinese room^ argument (Searle 1980). Rather, we want to make explicit the two-
5 An existing empirical study about the narratives of older women driving cars clearly shows the dependency
of the understanding of driving a car on both the Bpractical^ narratives (narratives about the practice of
driving) and Bexperiential^ narratives (narratives arising from the experience of driving) (Siren and Hakamies-
Blomqvist 2005)
6 This ties into Verbeek’s critique of Heideggerian philosophy of technology; which states that modern
technologies don’t disclose our being-in-the-world in a singular way as Bgestell^ (Verbeek 2005, p.72), but
rather in a myriad of different ways; depending on the type of technological mediation they instantiate.
7 Ricoeur deals with this Btemptation^ to consider Babsolute^ mediations in volume 3 of Time and Narrative,
in which he attacks Hegel’s notion of total mediation between human culture and the individual (Ricoeur
1988, p. 202)
8 Ricoeur uses the term Brelay station^ to indicate an epistemological structure which enables one to proceed
from one level of a hermeneutic analysis to the other (Ricoeur 1983, p.182).
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sided activity of understanding the world through a text: the text is adjusted to our
prefigured understanding (as a current computational state), and our understanding is
consequently configured (as a configured computational state) due to the interaction
with the text. Hence, the interpretation of a narrative implies a coinciding active process
of mental Breading^ and Bwriting^, understood as two dimensions of the practical
activity of understanding a text.
The degree of activity is determined by the extent to which a technology is similar to
the paradigm of the text. Some technologies have very little in common with the
paradigm of the text and for the most part play a role in our prefigured understanding.
For instance, a bridge is predominantly part of a prefigured narrative structure in which
events and characters are already configured into a plot: it may be a bridge to transport
goods and people across the Rhine River. When a bridge gets built, it plays a role in
configuring our narrative understanding (for example by disclosing new areas of a
country) but soon it becomes part of our prefigured time. Such an understanding of
technology ties into Heidegger’s analysis of the bridge (Heidegger 1977, p. 16): the
bridge has become a passive element of human culture in the course of several
generations. The bridge configured the narrative understanding of the people who
interacted with it once it was build, but in time became an element of their social reality
that found Bclosure^. This interpretation is in line with Joerges’ point that narratives are
the tools of politics, narratives in which technological artefacts play a passive role.
However, some technologies actively configure our narrative understanding. They can
simultaneously Bread^ and Bwrite^ our narrative understanding by bringing about a
process of emplotment. Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are
exemplary for this type of narrative technologies by being very closely related to the
paradigm of the text. This can first of all be derived from their very Btextual^ character:
many forms of human-computer interaction revolve around mediation by textual infor-
mation. More importantly, though, ICTs and humans can be said to Bco-author^ or Bco-
act^ the narratives they engage in. Blockchain technologies in particular are very text-
like technologies, not only with regards to their superficial textual qualities (primarily
understood as textual elements of their user interfaces), but also, and more importantly,
with regards to the configurative capacities of their code (their capacities to organise
characters and events in a meaningful plot). This does not refer to the actual reading of
the code, for instance by a cryptocurrency developer, but rather to the narrative
structures enabled by the code. For instance, interaction with the code of a blockchain
technology could configure a user’s narrative structures that form his understanding of
Bmoney^ and Bproperty .^ Thus, instead of looking at the source code in order to
investigate the narrative structures it configures, we aim to look at the plot, the
organisation of characters and events, as it is configured by blockchain technologies.
In order to make the notion of active configuration by technologies workable, we
consider the way in which Ricoeur explains that narrative configuration can configure
our understanding of the world: namely by organising the temporality of the plot. This
organisation of temporality of a narrative depends on two distinct temporal dimensions:
a chronological and an a-chronological one (Ricoeur 1983, p. 66). The chronological
dimension comes about by means of an episodic sequence of events (Bfirst this hap-
pened, secondly this happened^). This dimension is eventually directed at abolishing the
human sense of temporality, according to Ricoeur (1983, p. 160) by reducing temporal
experience to Bsimple succession^. In contrast, the a-chronological dimension enables a
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reader to oscillate between the narrative as a whole and separate events, to jump between
different Btimes^ (e.g. as happens in a flash back) and to create a sense of ending. The a-
chronological dimension of narrative configuration consequently entails a dynamism
that closes in on human temporal experience. For technologies that actively configure
our social world, this means that they can either enforce a rigid temporal structure on our
understanding of the social world or a dynamic one. Blockchain technologies are
paradigmatic in this respect, because of their fundamental capacity for decreasing a
sense of human temporality in the organisation of events they configure: reducing the
activity of humans transacting with one another to a simple recorded succession of
transactions (the enforced chronology of blocks added to the chain).
The second hermeneutic distinction we propose is one between abstracting and
engaging narrative technologies. This distinction captures the difference between what
Ricoeur conceptualises as the modes of historical and fictional narratives. Crucial to
understanding the difference between these two narrative modes is the significance of
historical narratives on the one hand as Bstanding for^ something that really happened
and of fictional narratives on the other hand to instantiate Bimaginative variations^
(Ricoeur 1988, p. 177). Thus, whereas history aims to achieve a level of strict
representation of historical events, fiction aims at providing both the author of a text
as well as its reader a sense of imaginative freedom, and correspondingly a sense of
responsibility (the responsibility of following the plot). However, Ricoeur stresses that
these two narrative modes are not absolutely separated, but are rather interwoven
(Ricoeur 1988, p. 99): history always contains elements of fictional narratives and vice
versa. Put differently, both history and fiction eventually adhere to the same model of
narrative configuration that makes them intelligible.
We argue that the same difference in Bnarrative modes^ (understood as a difference
in degree between two extremes) can be applied to technologies, meaning that tech-
nologies can (1) configure narratives that engage people by means of bringing about
imaginative variations or (2) configure narratives that are almost strictly representa-
tional (Bstanding for^ events that really happened) and abstract from the world of
action. A paradigm of the first kind of technologies is the video game, which can offer
players a great sense of freedom (and, correspondingly, of responsibility) by offering
the possibility of a multitude of imaginary variations in which the emplotment of
characters and events takes place. It thereby engages the players with the unfolding
process of emplotment. The blockchain can be regarded as paradigmatic for the second
kind of technologies, because it configures the narrative structure in such a way that it
stands for events that really happened. As such, the blockchain can be considered as a
technology that fixates our historical narrative in the form of a public archive contain-
ing both documents and traces9 (in the form of traceable transactions of digital objects)
that stand for, or represent the past Bas it really happened^. However, as Ricoeur
importantly notes, the term Breally^ is signified only through the concept Bas^ (Bas^
it really happened—representing a reality that has itself become inaccessible) (Ricoeur
1988, p. 155). This has the implication that in order to relate a transaction of a digital
9 Ricoeur argues that it is Bthe use of documents and archives that makes the trace an actual operator of
historical time^ (Ricoeur 1988, p. 184). In other words, a trace that refers back to something that has been
there in the past (such as a fossil, but equally so a validated block on the blockchain that can be Bre-traced^)
combined with the use of documentation or an archive (such as a public ledger that links to digital objects)
constitute a sense of historical time.
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object found on the blockchain to the actual event of it being transacted between actual
people, we have to deal with an abstraction from this actual event that took place. As
Ricoeur argues, Bthis abstraction is a result of forgetting the complex interplay of
significations that takes place between our expectations directed toward the future and
our interpretations oriented toward the past^ (Ricoeur 1988, p. 208—emphasis added).
This forgetting is the main effect of the abstraction brought about by the Bstanding for^
of a technology’s narrative configuration and has important normative implications, as
we will see later on.
To make this second hermeneutic distinction workable, we need to make explicit
what the abovementioned process of abstraction entails.10 Ricoeur explains that the way
in which narrative structures can be made increasingly abstract is by means of con-
structing so-called second- and third-order entities (or quasi-entities) that are based on
first-order entities, which are actual characters and events (Ricoeur 1983, p. 181).
Historical narrative does so by constructing quasi-entities such as BGermany^ and BFirst
World War^, which stand for actual characters (e.g. the German minister of foreign
affairs) and events (e.g. the battle of Warsaw). These quasi-entities can be organised in a
quasi-plot, which is a plot that is removed from direct interaction of characters and
events. For instance, socio-cultural structures like electronic networks and exchanges are
abstracted, quasi-entities that do not directly denote actual people or events. Nonethe-
less, any attempt aimed at explaining plots that involve theses structures will require and
activity of referring-back to first-order entities: it will require narratives about actual
characters that act within a first-order plot. In line with Ricoeur’s theory, we can say that
abstracting technologies remove themselves from the realm of action by configuring
quasi-characters and quasi-events in a quasi-plot. Blockchain technology and monetary
technologies that are built on it organise not so much humans and direct interactions
between them, but rather quasi-characters and quasi-events (Ricoeur 1983, p. 181). That
is, they organise quasi-characters such as Baddresses^ and Bexchanges^ and quasi-
events such as Btransactions^ in quasi-plots, such as Bmining a block^.
To illustrate how Ricoeur’s framework assists us to understand the way in which
technologies abstract from the world of action, we can think of a construct in the
financial world that is known as a derivative. The construct of a future—a specific type
of derivative—was already used in 1730 in Japanese rice markets (Takatsuki 2008) and
has evolved into one of the major financial products that are currently traded in the
global digital economy (Pryke and Allen 2000). A future is a contract with a price
agreement between two parties, based on the buying or selling of an asset at a specific
moment in the future. For instance, a rice farmer in Japan might agree with a derivative
trader that she is guaranteed to sell his future harvest at a certain price. This allows the
trader to bear some of the risk of the rice farmer (the harvest might fail, in which case
the income of the farmer is still guaranteed) and at the same time make a profit on it by
spreading out her own risk amongst multiple farmers. A derivative is a typical example
of a linguistic construct that abstracts from the world of action (the farmer who tries to
survive by harvesting from his lands) by constructing quasi-entities (e.g. derivative
exchanges, credit risks). These are quasi-entities because similar to quasi-entities in
10 As Ricoeur also suggests, modern technologies render Btime^ itself abstract: the machines that measure
time, such as digital clocks but the blockchain as well, enable an Babstract representation of time^ (Ricoeur
1983, p. 63).
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historical narrative (e.g. BGermany ,^ Bthe Iron Curtain^), they configure our under-
standing of the world without disclosing their mediation of the world of action. That is,
when a local derivative exchange goes down, a referral-back to the world of action
needs to be made in order to explain the event (for instance: a severe drought that
destroyed the harvests of all rice farmers who were securing their livelihood through
derivative contracts). As Pryke and Allen argue, in our contemporary world in which
derivatives as linguistic contracts have merged with digital technologies, they reflect a
cultural shift that is an Boutcome of a transformation in our experience of everyday
temporal and spatial co-ordinates^ (Pryke and Allen 2000, p.282). Derivatives have
become technologically mediated contracts that automatically respond to changes in the
quasi-plots they configure (e.g. price fluctuations, risk indicators), thereby increasingly
obscuring their configuration of the world of action. However, as the financial crisis in
2008 has shown us, a referral-back to the world of action, of families losing their
income and therefore being unable to pay their mortgage, was necessary to explain how
the abstract complexities of derivative trades could have contributed to a global
financial catastrophe (Hellwig 2009).
In addition to the two hermeneutic distinctions that characterise narrative configuration
by technologies, we need to account for the difference between the prevalence of
narratives about technologies and narratives configured by technologies. This is not a
hermeneutic distinction characterising the configuration by technologies as such, but
rather a classification of the position of a narrative structure as being either proximate or
remote from the actual human interaction with a technology. We refer to this difference,
which does not apply to the kinds of technologies but to the position of the human
interacting with them, as interpretative distance. To draw an illustrative comparison that
can assist in understanding this distinction, consider the narrative configuration of George
Orwell’s 1984 and the commentaries related to this configuration. By reading the book,
one’s ideas about the role of technologies in modern society might be configured. Even
though only a reader of the narrative engages in the process of narrative configuration,
commentaries about the narrative configure narrative structures of the same form (for
instance by stating the termOrwellian technology in an academic article) that nonetheless
are different in contents because they are farther removed from the original reading.
Similarly, there is a difference in understanding of the narrative configuration by
blockchain technology between a developer who works with its code (being very
proximate to the narrative configuration of the technology), its user who interacts with a
blockchain-based application interface and a person who only hears or reads about the
technology without having used it (being remote from the narrative configuration).
Carr captures this difference we call Binterpretative distance^ by conceptualising
two types of narratives as the practical Bfirst-order^ narrative (narratives configured
by technologies), and the Bsecond-order^ narrative (narratives about technologies)
that have the same subject but a different aim, namely an aesthetic or cognitive one
(Carr 1986, p.131). This distinction reflects Ricoeur’s distinction between
Bcommentary^ (which can be a text about a narrative) and a narrative configuration
itself (Ricoeur 1985, p.68). Even though both these types of narrative structures
have the same form, or in Ricoeur’s terms the same schematism, and are therefore
fundamentally interrelated, we need to distinguish between them because they
denote an interpretative distance between humans and technologies that can lead
to differences in power and understandings of the world. That is, the more a
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technology is accessible and the more one interacts with it, the more proximate one
gets to the first-order narrative configuration by technologies. For instance, a
layperson who is mildly interested in blockchain technologies has significantly less
power in co-authoring the narrative structures of blockchain technologies and a
different11 understanding of them than a core developer of Bitcoin. This is not to say
that those people interacting with first-order narrative structures necessarily have a
greater power over the narrative configuration of the technologies, compared to
people who only interact with second-order narrative structures. For instance, a
layperson in a powerful political position can enforce regulations that strongly
influence the prefigured narrative understanding in which the design of blockchain
technologies takes place. Rather, we refer to what Foucault designates as the
authority of expert knowledge (Philipps 1996) as an attribute of those people
interacting with first-order narrative structures of blockchain technologies. Accord-
ing to this understanding of power, people who are proximate to the first-order
narratives are powerful in the sense that they have acquired the capacity to co-
author the process of emplotment. A powerful regulator, when being far removed
from the first-order narrative, would not have this power to intentionally co-author
the process of emplotment, but only to change the prefigured circumstances in
which it takes place.
Before we proceed to the next section, it is important to stress that no direct
normative judgement can be derived from the two hermeneutic distinctions and the
distinction between interpretative distances. Whether active or passive and abstracting
or engaging technologies can be considered as normatively positive or negative cannot
be a priori determined but has to be interpreted in the context of the narrative structure
they configure.12 Moreover, even though for instance the accessibility of first-order
narrative configuration by nuclear technologies and interaction with those technologies
is highly restricted, this seems to be a beneficial thing. In a similar vein, the high
accessibility of the first-order narrative configuration by bicycles and high level of
interaction with them can be said to be very beneficial.
3 Applying the Framework of Narrative Technologies to Understand
Technological Mediation of the Blockchain
Now, we have presented the ontological framework of narrative technologies; we can
proceed to utilise it in order to analyse how blockchain technologies configure our
social reality, focussing on the illustrative example of cryptocurrencies. As a result of
this analysis, we will not only be able to explicate the mediating roles of
cryptocurrencies in a descriptive manner, outlining what cryptocurrencies are, but more
importantly in a normative manner, outlining what they do: how they configure our
social reality.
11 We explicitly refer to the difference in understanding of the narrative structure, rather than for instance to a
lesser understanding of a layperson. In certain cases, a certain remoteness from technological narrative
configuration might actually help inform the human about important hidden aspects of this configuration
(think for instance about the position of game addicts vis-à-vis non-addicted non-gamers).
12 This is based on a broader understanding of what Ihde designates as the understanding of the Buse-context^
of technologies (2009, p. 33).
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3.1 First Hermeneutic Dimension: the Active Narrative Configuration
of Cryptocurrencies
Firstly, we investigate how cryptocurrencies configure our narrative understanding both
passively (as elements of our prefigured narrative understanding) and actively (as tech-
nologies that actively configure characters and events in a plot). To analyse the prefigured
time in which cryptocurrencies play a role, we have to consider cultural Brepertoire^ out of
which they emerged, which means that we need to consider the narratives that surrounded
the world of money and finance at the birth of the blockchain.13 As Cameron argues, our
understanding of the monetary system is thoroughly shaped by narrative structures. In the
last decade, particularly after the financial crisis in 2008, these have been placed in the
greater context, or quasi-plot, of the global financial crisis. Cameron forcefully shows how
abstract financial processes have been broken down into narratives about people (bankers,
traders) that are characterised as BGods^ and Bdemons^ (Cameron 2015, p. 12), assigning
strong ethical qualities to these characters. Systems that were perceived as being ruled by
abstract rational calculations turned out to be embedded in a narrative structure incorpo-
rating characters with strong ethical qualities. The wake of cryptocurrencies can be
interpreted as being embedded in these global, prefigured narratives. One of the major
catalysing factors in the development of Bitcoin was the political blockade of Wikileaks
by the world’s major payment companies (Roio 2013, p. 4). On the one hand, this
blockade fuelled a narrative structure that laid bare the roles these financial companies
play, which showed that the assumed neutrality of the monetary system was illusory. On
the other hand, the emergence of Bitcoin configured this narrative understanding by
presenting an alternative based on two distinct features: the decentralisation of power
and the delegation of trust from legal authorities to the authority of the blockchain
protocol.
The emerging narrative or socio-technical imaginary as Jasanoff puts it (Jasanoff
2015) was based on prefigured narratives of the disillusions brought about by the
conventional financial system and the socio-technical promises of cryptocurrencies as
being part of a Blibertarian dream^ (Karlstrøm 2014). Cryptocurrencies are thus part of
a prefigured understanding with ethical and political qualities, in which different
narratives about the technology compete (Dawson and Buchanan 2005). Unlike with
the example of the bridge we discussed earlier, the prefigured understanding of
blockchain technologies is not yet part of a passive cultural repertoire. We can illustrate
this by observing how the developers of Ethereum, which is a platform for creating all
sorts of decentralised, blockchain-based applications, describe their most recent crea-
tion: the DAO—a first full-scale implementation of a decentralised autonomous orga-
nisation. They describe it as a Bblockchain congress^ in which humans and artificial
agents together organise their worldly relations (Ethereum 2016). By offering such
narratives, the Ethereum developers play an important role in transforming the
13 The careful observer will have noted that we provide only a very limited account of the prefigured
understanding of cryptocurrencies, since other cultural Brepertoires^ (as formed by e.g. the cypherpunk
movement or the scientific community working on cryptography) are left out. As mentioned in the previous
section, we focus on the stage of narrative configuration and less so on the stage of narrative prefiguration in
this paper. This passage is meant to illustrate the relevance of including the narrative prefiguration in order to
gain a holistic understanding of the narrative configuration, as well as to reply to important findings of the
earlier mentioned STS literature.
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prefigured technical imaginary of blockchain technologies: envisioning its promises in
sometimes-utopian futures. However, their interpretations of blockchain technologies
have recently been confronted by other narratives in the context of the so-called BDAO
attack^, which we will discuss at a later point.
Next to analysing the prefigured time of cryptocurrencies, our framework of narra-
tive technologies helps us to explicate that cryptocurrencies actively configure our
narrative understanding. 14 In line with Dupont, we argue that the reason why
cryptocurrencies can be said to be active narrative monetary technologies is because
they can actively Bmodulate^ the social order of humans and things (DuPont 2014,
p.7). To assess what kind of active configuration cryptocurrencies bring about, we have
to consider how they organise the temporal dimensions in the plots they configure. This
analysis relates to a fundamental problem that blockchain technologies aim to solve: the
so-called Btimestamping problem^, which is the problem of validating the chronolog-
ical order of transactions (Van Rompay et al. 1999). By time-stamping transactions and
adding them in a fixed, irreversible order to the public ledger, cryptocurrencies enforce
the chronological time dimension in the narrative structure of transactions. Based on the
previous analysis, we can argue that they therefore render the a-chronological dimen-
sions of the transactions increasingly obsolete by enforcing chronological time into
their systems. This process configures our understanding of Bmaking a transaction^
from an organisation of events with no fixed order that can be reversed, to one with a
fixed order that is irreversible. However, we emphasise that this configuration of the
temporal aspects of transactions remains subject to the Bfallibility^ of empirical reality.
Cryptocurrencies can be said to move towards the ideal of abolishing the a-
chronological temporal dimension, but are not free from practical flaws, illustrated
for instance by Bitcoin’s Btransaction malleability^ (Decker and Wattenhofer 2014).
This is in accordance with Ricoeur’s argument that even though texts can enforce a
rigid, chronological narrative structure, they always retain dynamic, a-chronological
aspects: aspects that can undo the order enforced by the technology.
How could this active configuration of our human time by blockchain technologies
affect our understanding of social reality? By allowing transactions to be delegated to
blockchain technologies, and therefore increasingly getting rid of the a-chronological
dimensions of inter-human exchange, our social relations are transformed in such a way
that they become rigid, irreversible and non-negotiable. For certain social relations such
as financial transactions, this level of rigidity can be beneficial for it prevents cases of
fraud, counterfeiting and Bcreative bookkeeping^. However, as Ricoeur shows, the
consequent decrease of a dynamic understanding of temporality reduces the freedom
and the responsibility of humans interacting with the blockchain. In the case of social
relations that rely on free and responsibly acting humans, for instance relations between
caregiver and caretaker, the application of blockchain technologies might have
disempowering effects. Inter-human relations might become Bentangled^ in their
technological dependency as argued also by Hodder (Hodder 2014). We would regard
the transactions or the contracts mediated by the blockchain technology as the rigid
14 In line with Winner (1980), we thus argue for a stronger sense in which technologies configure our social
reality. It is the configurative capacity of the artefacts and the technologies themselves (the extent to which
they are similar to the paradigm of the text), next to the discourse that surrounds them, which shapes our social
reality. However, since we argue that narrative structures are co-shaped by humans and technologies, we
denounce Winner’s technological determinism.
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end-points of our relations with other human beings, rather than intermediate relay
stations. In case a contract is formally breached, the blockchain protocol functions as
the arbiter: its acceptation or rejection of a transaction functions as the final verdict
without a question being asked as to whether the transaction is desirable in the first
place, given the social context in which it took place. For instance, a health insurance
policy based on blockchain technology could automatically block coverage according
to automatically detected violations of the Bsmart contract^, disregarding the personal
contexts affected by the technology’s configurations.
3.2 Second Hermeneutic Dimension: the Abstracting Narrative Capacity
of Cryptocurrencies
Secondly, we can use our framework to investigate how cryptocurrencies configure
abstractions from the world of action they mediate. Georg Simmel already mentioned
this process of abstraction in his classical account of the cultural impacts of financial
technologies in his work The Philosophy ofMoney (Simmel 1900). In this work, Simmel
questions the processes of abstraction (what he refers to as Bdistancing^) that accompa-
nied the development of modern money (Simmel 1900, p. 4). According to Simmel,
there is a Bprofound cultural trend^ Simmel (1900, p. 148) towards the quantitative;
money is part of that trend in so far as it becomes Bpure quantity in numerical form^ (p.
150). Because of this trend, money moves away from the world of action of consuming,
producing and trading people. We can reframe Simmel’s account of money to under-
stand the abstraction brought about by cryptocurrencies by using our conceptual
framework of narrative technologies. As we argued, blockchain technologies move
towards a configuration of social reality that is strictly representational, meaning that
the blockchain itself aims at configuring history of actual transactions between people as
they really happened. However, the narrative mode involved in this configuration (one
that is similar to what Ricoeur designated as the historical narrative mode) inherently
brings about an abstraction from the world of action it represents. As Ricoeur indicates,
this process of abstraction, which involves the replacement of first-order entities and
events (e.g. actual people engaging in actual trades) by quasi-entities and events
(addresses engaging in transactions and nodes validating these), has as its primary effect
a forgetting of the complex interplay of significations that configured the emplotment of
the first-order entities and events. We can analyse the normative implications of this
process of forgetting by looking at the way in which cryptocurrencies configure
narrative structures that abstract from the world of action they mediate.
The notion of Btrust^, abstracted from the world of action by cryptocurrencies, is
central in this analysis. Nakamoto put the notion of Btrust^ at the centre of the
decentralised architecture of Bitcoin, though without offering a clear explication of
its meaning (Nakamoto 2008). One of the core intentions of his design of the
blockchain was to render the trust in first-order entities—the complex and messy trust
that defines the human social world—obsolete. In modern times, trust in first-order
entities such as people and material goods has already increasingly been replaced by
trust in a more abstract monetary system. As money dematerialised, trust increasingly
depended on what was written down and recorded (Coeckelbergh 2015b). We argue
that blockchain technology goes beyond this abstraction due to dematerialisation, by
turning trust between people (first-order entities) into trust in decentralised
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technological systems (quasi-entities). Dupont and Maurer strikingly illustrate this
point in their discussion of smart contracts, which are computational mechanisms
executed on a blockchain that enforce rules of interaction between different nodes. It
is argued that smart contracts replace the Bdifficult social and psychological work of
contracting with self-executing code^ (Dupont and Maurer 2015). In line with this
claim, we argue that the acts of negotiating and discussing a contractual agreement
between first-order entities in the world of action is rendered abstract in a smart contract
by the configuration of quasi-entities (e.g. addresses included in the smart contract) and
quasi-events (e.g. the price of a certain digital asset rising above a pre-determined
threshold) in quasi-plots (such as a rule-governed execution of the smart contract). The
first-order narrative that a smart-contract stands for is forgotten in this process: the
quasi-plot of the smart contract eventually configures the narrative structures that
mediate our social world.
However, we also showed that this process of abstraction is never absolute (thereby
denouncing a form of determinism). In line with Ricoeur, we argue that any attempt to
explain abstract processes configured by blockchain technologies will always involve a
referral-back to first-order entities, an explanatory process that Ricoeur refers to as
Bretrodiction^ 15 (Ricoeur 1983, p. 135). This especially happens whenever a
cryptocurrency system Bbreaks down^ due to technological limitations, suffers from
attacks on cryptocurrency exchanges or is affected by other unintended factors. At such
moments, the narrative structure of first-order entities (traders, programmers, users) and
their normative roles is revealed. In line with Heidegger, we can say that abstract
entities configured by the blockchain are only revealed when the technologies break
down and become Bpresent at hand^, when the trust in the computational system is
eroding. Heidegger writes in Being and Time about the Bconspicuousness^ of tools that
lose their usefulness; they are then stared at as Bsomething objectively present^
(Heidegger 1996, p. 69), becoming a technology that we are unable to put our trust
in anymore. We illustrate this point by referring to the recent attack on the so-called
BDAO^, which, as we mentioned earlier, is the first full-scale implementation of the
idea of a decentralised autonomous organisation. By exploiting a systemic weakness in
the system, an attacker was able to obtain an amount of cryptocurrency (Ether) that at
the day of the attack had a market value of approximately 60 million Dollars. This
attack created friction in the community of users and developers of the DAO, with
some arguing in favour of keeping intact the abstraction brought about by the system
(arguing that developers should not interfere with its basic design) and the others
arguing that the community should Brewrite history^ by interfering in the blockchain’s
basic design and thereby countering the attack (Reutzel 2016). This event clearly shows
how the abstraction brought about by the blockchain is challenged by the community
that built it by referring back to the world of action, of complex significations and
intent. Moreover, it reveals an important normative implication of the narrative
configurations of blockchain technologies, namely that they result in a forgetting of
the complex significations that exist in the world of action that they configure. This
15 That is, to explain the narrative configuration of the blockchain, we Bdo not authorise prediction, but rather
retrodiction, in the sense that, beginning from the fact that something has happened, we infer, backward
through time, that the antecedent necessary condition must have occurred and we look for its traces in the
present^ (Ricoeur 1983, p. 135—emphasis added). This implies that we have to refer back to the world of
action to explain abstracted narrative configurations.
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means that the intentions of the people interacting with one another through blockchain
technologies can become hidden, which reduces normative judgements to either the
acceptance of rejection of transactions by the blockchain.
3.3 Interpretative Distances of Blockchain Narratives
Thirdly, we need to take into account the interpretative distance between Bcommentaries^
of blockchain technologies (second-order narratives about the technologies) and the
narrative structures that arise from active configuration by blockchain technologies
(first-order narratives).16 We can observe for instance significant differences between
regulatory frameworks that can be seen as second-order narrative structures of blockchain
technologies (De Filippi 2013), between Bitcoin developers, Bitcoin users and policy
makers in different countries. Regulators disagree about the extent to which Bitcoins can
be legally regarded as commodities, as electronic money or intangible assets and in which
way taxation should play a role in setting up regulatory schemes for cryptocurrencies. In
the words of Pinch and Bijker, we could say that no Bclosure^ has yet been reached in the
regulation of Bitcoin (Pinch and Bijker 1984). However, rather than saying that closure is
a process of converging narratives about the technology of different social groups, we
argue that narratives configured by the technology significantly add to this process. We
need to remember that commentaries such as regulatory regimes do not directly impact
the technology design of the blockchain, but that this can only happen through the
involvement of Bproximate^ first-order narrative structures (developers re-designing
the technology). Because for blockchain technologies, no closure has yet occurred,
interpretative distances might change substantially in the future, which means that the
following analysis can merely serve as a preliminary one. We argue that at least when
considering the current state of affairs, both the accessibility of the technology (with
regards to regulatory restriction, but also sufficient technical competences) and the degree
of interaction with it are indicative of the interpretative distances of cryptocurrencies. The
first-order narrative configuration by blockchain technologies seems to be very accessible
to developers of cryptocurrencies, who also intensively interact with the technologies.
Their narrative understanding of cryptocurrencies is mostly shaped by active configura-
tion of the blockchain protocol: working with the code and its applications on a daily
basis. In contrast, the first-order narrative structure is much less accessible to an interested
layman who has neither ever made a transaction nor has knowledge of the way in which
the technology is able to shape our social reality. We can discuss the normative aspects of
these differences of access to and interaction with the technology between different
people.
At the moment, a relatively small number of people, primarily belonging to the
cryptocurrency developer community, have a high level of access to and interaction
with the narrative configuration by blockchain technologies. A growing number of
users of cryptocurrencies—people actually performing cryptocurrency transaction—
have gained considerable levels of access and interaction as well, experiencing the
16 We should not confuse the distinction between first-order entities in a plot and second- and third-order
entities in a quasi-plot, with the distinction between first- and second-order narratives at this point. The first
distinction indicates a feature of the hermeneutic Bschema^ that functions as basis for understanding any
narrative configuration by technologies, while the second distinction indicates the distance between the
narrative configuration by the technology and the interpreter.
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ways in which the understanding of transactions and systemic trust are configured.
However, a vast number of people have a narrative understanding of cryptocurrencies
that is predominantly configured by second-order narratives (about the technology).
They might have interacted with narratives about Nakamoto’s mysterious virtual
money, the dubious use of Bitcoins on Silk Road and the scandal of the collapse of
the Mt. Gox Bitcoin exchange (Decker and Wattenhofer 2014), but have not interacted
with the technology itself. As argued before, no direct normative implications can be
derived from the current state of the interpretative distances to the first-order narrative
configuration of cryptocurrencies. However, since we have shown that blockchain
technologies such as cryptocurrencies can potentially have significant impacts on the
way our social relations are configured, a case can be made for the need to democratise
the design and application of blockchain technologies to increase accessibility and
interaction. If the blockchain can really configure our social reality as a Btechno-
leviathan^ (Scott, 2014), in which case it would be a highly political technology, we
would want more people to understand and interact with it. This can be done by both
improving Bcryptocurrency literacy^ through education, but also by subjecting the
governance of cryptocurrency design to a greater level of democratic scrutiny.
4 Concluding Remarks
BAll the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely players^ (Shakespeare
1623, p. 52). These words of Shakespeare remind us of the importance to consider the
impacts technologies have on the narratives that shape our lives. As Agre (2003)
argues, technological developments are usually Bwrapped in^ stories, or narrative
structures that are not just technical but also encompass collective ideas of how should
build our societies, our institutional reality. In this article, we focussed on blockchain
technologies and showed that they are not merely Bnarrative^ in the sense that they are
part of the stories that we—as persons, communities and societies—tell about them.
Blockchain technologies do much more: they configure the narratives through which
we understand our social reality. To arrive at this claim, we offered an original
interpretation of Ricoeur’s narrative theory: applying his notion of narrative configu-
ration to our understanding of technological mediation. Utilising the resulting frame-
work of narrative technologies, we came to the following analyses concerning the ways
in which blockchain technologies configure our social reality:
& Blockchain technologies actively configure our understanding of social reality.
They do so by enforcing the chronological temporal dimension in the organisation
of characters and events. This renders social relations increasingly rigid, at the cost
of a loss of dynamism and consequently of a sense of freedom and responsibility.
& Blockchain technologies configure narrative structures that abstract from the realm
of action. They do so by constructing quasi-entities in quasi-plots that stand for
events as they actually happened. This leads to a forgetting of the configuration of
first-order entities, which can be recovered through retrodiction.
& Blockchain technologies configure distances between second-order narratives about
the technology and first-order narratives arising from the active configuration by the
technology. This can lead to distances in understanding and power between people
The Blockchain as a Narrative Technology
only involved in the second-order narratives and those—especially people belong-
ing to the developer communities—involved in the first-order narratives.
These analyses reveal the normative implications of blockchain technologies by
making explicit how they configure our social reality. However, they do not amount to
a full-fledged ethical or political evaluation of blockchain technologies: we did not
confer a judgement on the types of configurations brought about (whether they can be
said to be positive or negative). To conclude, we engage in some initial suggestions that
could inform future investigations into the ethical and political implications of
blockchain technologies.
First, we should stress that even though our analyses show that we should be critical
about the ways in which blockchain technologies are applied, they do have the capacity to
bring about certain distinctly positive contributions to our societies. In line with Simmel,
we argue that the positive implications of abstracting monetary technologies such as
cryptocurrencies lie in their capacity to emancipate and empower people. If social relations
become less personal, then this also renders them more free: relations become a matter of
choice and technologies like cryptocurrencies become a guarantee for people’s inclusion
in the realm of economic exchange, regardless of their personal, racial or cultural
background and status. This ties in with the promise of decentralisation that is configured
by the blockchain. Decentralisation of a currency entails a Bde-personalisation^ of power:
the technology makes it difficult for single human agents to subject others to their will
within the system. Moreover, the blockchain technology enables people to communicate
and transact with one another from any location; they firmly reduce physical-geographical
boundaries. For this reason, it is said that cryptocurrencies could empower people to gain
the benefits from financial services in developing countries that have so far been secluded
from access to banking services (Clegg 2014).
Secondly, we should discuss the potential of blockchain technologies for bringing
about negative ethical and political implications. As we argued, the potential for
emancipation brought about by blockchain technologies comes with a price, namely
that even though entering into social relations becomes more of a question of choice, the
social relations themselves become rigid. This can be beneficial in some social contexts,
notably those that require rigid interactions (e.g. in the contexts of financial services and
property registers), but would arguably be very harmful in other contexts (e.g. in the
contexts of human care and education). Especially for social contexts in which there is a
necessity for human freedom and responsibility in shaping social interactions, the
application of blockchain technologies will probably be very undesirable.
Moreover, we argue in line with Simmel that the abstraction from the narrative of
inter-human exchange comes with a cost. By delegating the trust in transactions from
first-order entities to quasi-entities, the intentions of people acting through the system
are delegated to the level of the system itself—thereby hiding the realm of action that is
affected. Whatever kind of transaction one performs through the system, the primary
normative check is whether the system accepts or declines it. What kind of transaction
is performed (which can be a Bgood^ or a Bbad^ transaction) becomes irrelevant. This
can have significant effects on power-relations between people and institutions. With
trust being delegated to the quasi-entities of the cryptocurrency system, power struggles
might arise, first between cryptocurrency networks and states but more importantly
perhaps between new and existing systems. While already banks are investing huge
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sums of money in blockchain technology (Samman 2015) and cryptocurrencies might
be viable forms of state currencies (Malefijt 2014), it is uncertain whether the
decentralised features of the technology will also result in decentralisation of institu-
tional power. Since the ability for social control (by means of active configuration by
the technology) is optimised within a cryptocurrency system, the question of who
controls the system remains of pivotal ethical and political importance.
What our investigation shows is that our understanding of blockchain technologies
is not merely a technical matter, but that it strongly relates to the ways in which we
normatively construct, or rather configure our social world. Future discussions of these
technologies should therefore explore how we can implement them in a way that
empowers people but that also leaves room for mitigating the potential dangers they
bring about. This will require investigating how the governance of the design and use
of these technologies can be improved, for instance by looking at ways in which the
design process can be organised in a more democratic way.
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